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BROWN UNIVERSITY

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Home Contact Information

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Personal Information: Born on January 30, 1985. Male. United States Citizen.

Undergraduate Studies:

B.S., Electrical & Computer Engineering, Worcester Polytechnic Institute, High Distinction, 2006

Graduate Studies:

Brown University, 2010 to present

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Thesis Title: “Informal Institutions, Insurance, and Investment”

Expected Completion Date: December 2017

References:

Professor Andrew Foster
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Professor Anja Sautmann
Dir. Research, Education, & Training, J-PAL
Cambridge, MA 02142
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Professor Mark Dean
Columbia University Dpt. of Economics
New York, NY 10027
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Purdue University, 2008-2010

M.S. in Agricultural Economics

Thesis Title: “Rural Electric Cooperatives’ Adoption of Renewable Energy Technology”

References:

Professor Paul V. Preckel
Purdue Univ. Dpt. of Agricultural Economics
West Lafayette, Indiana 47907
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Professor Brigitte S. Waldorf
Purdue Univ. Dpt. of Agricultural Economics
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Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary field: Applied Microeconomics

Secondary fields: Economic Development, Microeconomic Theory, Economics of Health and Population, Experimental Economics

Teaching Experience:

Spring 2016	Intermediate Microeconomics (Mathematical), Brown University, teaching fellow for Professor Roberto Serrano
Spring 2015	Principles of Economics, Brown University, teaching fellow for Prof. Rachel Friedberg
Fall 2014	Applied Research Methods for Economists, Brown University, teaching fellow for Prof. Daniel Björkegren
Spring 2011	Race and Inequality in the US, Brown University, teaching fellow for Prof. Glenn C. Loury
Fall 2010	Econometrics II, Brown University, teaching fellow for Prof. Adam McCloskey

Research Experience and Other Employment:

2014-2015	The World Bank, Independent Consultant for the Health, Nutrition and Population Global Practice Group
2006-2008	The MITRE Corporation, Digital/Microelectronic Hardware Engineer

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2013	Trainee Fellowship, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
2012	Trainee Fellowship, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development
2010	Outstanding Master's Thesis Award, Purdue University
2010	The Honor Society of Agriculture

Research Papers:

“Informal Insurance and Investment” ([Job Market Paper](#))

We propose a joint model of informal insurance and investment. The key innovations of our model are that income is endogenous and the division of the surplus from risk-sharing is determined by a Nash bargaining procedure. We find that under risk-sharing, the ratio of households' marginal utilities changes in direct proportion to any changes in the value of their outside options. Because of this, households take on sub-optimal levels of risk to improve their outside options and, consequently, increase their share of the income pool. This leads to substantive inefficiencies in equilibrium. We test our model using panel data from PROGRESA, a large-scale government intervention in rural Mexico that features bi-yearly transfers of roughly 35% of household income given to eligible households. We find that non-beneficiary households inefficiently take on *less* risk in response to beneficiary neighbors' increased income, as our model predicts.

“Subsidies, Information, and the Timing of Children's Health Care in Mali”, with Anja Sautmann and Mark Dean, submitted

We study how healthcare subsidies and improved information affect over- and under-use of primary healthcare in a randomized controlled trial of 1544 children in Mali. In a dynamic model of healthcare demand, misuse relative to policymaker preferences (here given by WHO care-seeking standards) arises from seeking care too early or too late during an illness spell. Using nine weeks of daily data, we show that the barrier to optimal care seeking is cost, not information: subsidies increase demand by over 250%, but overuse is rare with or without the subsidy. Information, contrary to intent, appears to increase underuse, as our model predicts.

White Papers:

“Renewable Power Opportunities for Rural Communities”, with David G. Nderitu, Paul V. Preckel, Douglas J. Gotham, and Benjamin W. Allen